Florida State University College of Law

Scholarship Repository
Scholarly Publications
1985

International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism
Fernando R. Tesón
Florida State University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Fernando R. Tesón, International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 869 (1985),
Available at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles/30

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Scholarly Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact efarrell@law.fsu.edu.

International Human Rights and
Cultural Relativism
FERNANDO

R. TES6N*

Notre conception des droits de l'homme ne varie pas
selon les latitudes ni selon les circonstances. 1
I

INTRODUCTION

We are witnessing an unequivocal process of universalization of
the concern for human dignity.2 As international law becomes

more responsive to the demands for individual freedom, however,
it necessarily challenges the validity of certain state practices reflecting geographical and cultural particularities. The tension between national sovereignty and the enforcement of international
* Associate Professor of Law, Arizona State University. J.D. 1975, Universidad de Buenos
Aires; Licenci6 en Droit International 1982, Universit6 Libre de Bruxelles; currently SJ.D.
candidate, Northwestern University. This article grew out of a presentation delivered to the
Conference on Third World Legal Studies at Harvard Law School in December 1983. I am
grateful to my colleagues David Kaye and David Kader for their valuable suggestions. The
remaining mistakes are only mine.
1. President Francois Mitterand on the eve of his trip to the Soviet Union, Le Monde,
May 17, 1984, at 1, col. 5. ("Our conception of human rights does not vary with latitudes or
with circumstances.") [trans. by eds.].
2. For a survey of the literature dealing with what has been, in the words of Professor
Sohn, a true "human rights revolution," Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of
the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AnL U.L. Rev. 1 (1982), see Vincent-Daviss,
Human Rights Law- A Research Guide to the Literature-Part I International Law and the
United Nations, 14 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & PoL 209 (1981); Vincent-Daviss, Human Rights Law:
A Research Guide to the Literature-Part IMInternational Protection of Refugees, and Humanitarian Law, 14 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & PoL 487 (1982); Vincent-Daviss, Human Rights
Law: A Research Guide to the Literature-Part I: The International Labor Organization
and Human Rights, 15 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & PoL 211 (1982) [hereinafter collectively cited as
Vincent-Daviss, Human Rights Law Research Guides].
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human rights standards is highlighted when governments point to
national cultural traditions to justify failures to comply with international law.3 States espousing such positions have found invaluable allies not only in Third World writers,4 but also among certain
Western legal scholars,5 anthropologists, and philosophers.6
"Cultural relativism" is not a term of art, nor even a legal term.
It has been borrowed from anthropology and moral philosophy, a
fact that has several consequences. First, because an intimate link
exists between the moral and legal dimensions of relativism,7 both
the philosophical aspects of relativism and the status of that doctrine in positive international law will be discussed. Second, the
theory of cultural relativism has several different possible meanings.' While the core idea of cultural relativism will be discussed
and critiqued," arguments that relativists could or should advance
will also occasionally be anticipated, even though such arguments
may not yet have been articulated by relativist scholars or
governments.
In the context of the debate about the viability of international
human rights, cultural relativism may be defined as the position
according to which local cultural traditions (including religious, political, and legal practices) properly determine the existence and
scope of civil and political rights enjoyed by individuals in a given
society. 10 A central tenet of relativism is that no transboundary le-

3. See, e.g., the statement made by the Saudi Arabian representative to the United Nations, 32 U.N. GAOR C.3 (43rd mtg.) at 11-13, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/32/SR.43 (1977) (different
social, cultural, and political traditions justify different interpretations of human rights),
4. See, e.g., Wai, Human Rights in Sub-Sahara Africa, in Human Rights: Cultural and
Ideological Perspectives 1 (A. Pollis & P. Schwab eds. 1979) (claiming that Western-oriented
human rights notions embodied in the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration on
Human Rights may not be applicable in non-Western areas); Mani, Regional Approaches to
the Implementation of Human Rights, 21 Indian J. Int'l L. 96, 97 (1981).
5. A recent work by E. McWhinney, United Nations Law Making (1984), bears the following subtitle: Cultural and Ideological Relativism and International Law Making for an Era
of Transition.
6. See, e.g., M. Herskovits, Man and His Works 61-78 (1949); E. Westermarck, Ethical
Relativity 183-219 (1932).
7. See infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 10-13.
10. Many contemporary situations exemplify the tension between domestic cultural imperatives and international norms: mutilation and flogging as criminal punishment (see U.S.
Dep't of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 1084 (1981); Marett, Some
Medical Problems Met in Saudi Arabia, 4 U.S.A.F. Med. J. 31, 36 (1953)); the circumcision
of women (see Dullea, Female Circumcision a Topic at U.N. Parley, N.Y. Times, July 18,
1980, at B4, col. 3.); the subjugation of women (see White, Legal Reform as an Indicator of
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gal or moral standards exist against which human rights practices

may be judged acceptable or unacceptable." Thus, relativists claim
that substantive human rights standards vary among different cultures and necessarily reflect national idiosyncracies. What may be
regarded as a human rights violation in one society may properly
be considered lawful in another, and Western ideas of human

rights should not be imposed upon Third World societies.' 2 Tolerance and respect for self-determination preclude crosscultural normative judgments. Alternatively, the relativist thesis holds that
even if, as a matter of customary or conventional international law,
a body of substantive human rights norms exists, its meaning varies substantially from culture to culture. 13
The critique advanced here of cultural relativism shall be limited in several important ways. First, the paper will only deal with
violations of civil and political rights-the so-called "first generation" rights. Cultural relativism will not be analyzed in relation to
other human rights that may be part of international law, such as
the socioeconomic or "second generation" rights.14 Second, cultural

Women's Status in Muslim Nations, in Women in the Muslim World 52 (L. Beck & N.
Keddie eds. 1978); Marshall, Tradition and the Veilh Female Status in Tunisia and Algeria,
19 J. Mod. African Stud. 635, 632-37 (1981)); and various authoritarian methods of government (see Note, Human Rights Practices in the Arab States- The Modem Impact of Shari'a
Values, 12 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 55, 92 (1981) (Shari'a values established a philosophical
foundation for human rights abuses)). All of these examples of contemporary practices,
while clearly unlawful by international standards, are defended by some as being required or
permitted by cultural traditions. See also the discussion of the Iranian position on human
rights in E. McWhinney, supra note 5, at 210.
11. Since the main concern of international human rights is the position of the individual
vis-i-vis the government, the expression "human rights practices" encompasses, in addition
to governmental acts, actions by groups or individuals that governments tolerate or condone
(e.g., religious practices carried out by the clergy and tolerated by the state).
12. See supra note 4.
13. See Pollis, Liberal, Socialist and Third World Perspectives on Human Rights, in Toward a Human Rights Framework 1, 23 (A. Pollis & P. Schwab eds. 1982) (arguing that
human rights judgments ought to be determined "by the criteria set by the philosophic/
cultural/ideological roots of particular states"); Said & Nasser, The Use and Abuse of Democracy in Islam, in International Human Rights: Contemporary Issues 61 (J. Nelson & V.
Green eds. 1980) ("freedom exists in Islam as long as it serves the interest of the
community").
14. For a complete though somewhat uncritical account of the evolution and meaning of
the different "generations" of rights in the United Nations, see Sohn, supra note 2, and
references cited therein. The so-called "third generation" of human rights are the "solidarity" rights. The advocacy of this new set of rights may represent an attempt to use the
favorable emotive connections of human rights language to expand the "rights" of the state
at the expense of individual rights. Cf. Alston, A Third Generation of Solidarity Rights:
Progressive Development or Obfuscation of International Human Rights Law?, 29 Neth.
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relativism must be distinguished from the thesis that governments,
especially those of the Third World, may suppress, delay or suspend civil and political rights in an effort to achieve a just economic order. While the issue of whether socioeconomic rights
should in certain situations have priority over civil and political
rights has received a great deal of attention in human rights literature,15 it differs from the problems raised by cultural relativism
stricto sensu.'e
The discussion here will be further circumscribed by two assumptions which have solid foundations in international law. The
first assumption is that human rights are a substantive part of international law, not only as a matter of treaty, but also as part of
customary law. 17 It follows that arguments premised upon the ex-

Int'l L. Rev. 307, 321 (1982) (proponents of such rights have a strong burden of proof to
show that they are compatible with and do not devalue existing rights).
15. See Forsythe, Socioeconomic Human Rights: The United Nations, the United States
and Beyond, 4 Hum. Rts. Q. 433, 434-45 (1982); Zalaquett, An Interdisciplinary Approach to
Development and Human Rights, 4 B.C. Third World L.J. 1, 28-31 (1983). Unlike "solidarity" rights, socioeconomic rights represent a positive force in the fight to enhance human
dignity. However, the emergence of socioeconomic rights need not entail the demise or contraction of civil and political rights. It should be noted that authoritarian regimes, whether
Marxist or not, invariably defend the priority of socioeconomic rights. See Forsythe, supra,
at 434. The U.N. majority appears to take the position that socioeconomic rights deserve as
much attention as civil and political rights. See G.A. Res. 34/46, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (70th
mtg.) at para 4, U.N. Doc. AIRes. 34/46 (1979). The philosophical literature has devoted
considerable attention to the priority issue since the publication of John Rawls' A Theory of
Justice (1971). Rawls suggests a "lexical" order between civil and political freedoms on the
one hand and economic principles of justice on the other. Id. at 243-50. Some of the numerous responses to Rawls' solution of the priority problem include B. Barry, The Liberal Theory of Justice ch. 8 (1973), and Hart, Liberty and Its Priority, in Reading Rawls 230 (N.
Daniels ed. 1975).
16. The position that socioeconomic rights should have priority over civil and political
rights need not embrace cultural relativism. The relativist thesis states that cultural standards-and not economic development or the need to implement distributive justice-determine the extent and nature of human rights. A government that justifies human
rights deprivations by appealing to economic priorities may well reject cultural relativism.
Some of the arguments marshalled in this article, however, are also directed to the thesis of
the priority of socioeconomic rights. See infra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
17. See H. Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights 147-52 (1950) (human
rights provisions of the U.N. Charter are binding). Accord Haile, Human Rights, Stability
and Development in Africa: Some Observations on Concept and Reality, 24 Va. J. Int'l L.
575, 581 (1984). See also M. McDougal, H. Lasswell & C. Chen, Human Rights and World
Public Order 7-27 (1980) (human rights are binding as a result of the combined effect of
treaties, U.N. resolutions, diplomatic intercourse, and the impressive rise of awareness of
the problem in world opinion); D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International
Law, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1110, 1128-49 (1982) (human rights have become part of customary
international law through the process of generalization of treaty provisions). On the other
hand, some commentators deny that human rights are part of international law. See, e.g.,
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clusively municipal nature of human rights law are inconsistent
with present international law.1 8 The cultural relativist may, but
need not, disagree with this assumption. He need only hold that
the various freedoms have different meanings when applied to different societies. 9 Some relativists would even agree that a few basic human rights, such as the right to life and the freedom from
torture, are absolute in the sense that even cultural traditions may
not override them. But relativists do not regard other rights, such
as the right to physical integrity, the right to participate in the
election of one's government, the right to a fair trial, freedom of
expression, freedom of association, freedom of movement, or the
20
prohibition of discrimination, as required by international law.
While I assume that the core meaning of international human
rights law encompasses rights beyond the right to life and to freedom from torture, I do not attempt to prove this assumption.
Rather, my main thesis can be condensed into the following two
propositions:
a) If there is an international human rights standard-the exact scope of which is admittedly difficult to
ascertain-then its meaning remains uniform across
borders.
b) Analogously, if there is a possibility of meaningful
moral discourse about rights, then it is universal in nature and applies to all human beings despite cultural
differences.
The second assumption made in this paper is that an obligation
in international law indeed exists to respect the cultural identities
of peoples, their local traditions, and customs.2 1 For example, the

Lane, Demanding Human Rights: A Change in the World Legal Order?, 6 Hofstra L. Rev.
269 (1978); Watson, Normativity and Reality in International Human Rights Law, 123 Stetson L. Rev. 221 (1984); Watson, The Limited Utility of International Law in the Protection
of Human Rights, 1980 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 1.
18. See L. Goodrich, E. Hambro & A. Simmons, Charter of the United Nations 370-78
(1949); M. Rajan, The Expanding Jurisdiction of the United Nations 98-123 (1982).
19. See, e.g., Pollis, supra note 13, at 22-23.
20. See Murphy, Objections to Western Conceptions of Human Rights, 9 Hofstra L. Rev.
433 (1981).
21. See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA.
Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 123, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) ("Every State has
an inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social, and cultural sstems without
interference in any form by another State.") [hereinafter cited as Declaration on Principles].
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classical international law on the treatment of aliens has long recognized that Westerners cannot expect to enjoy Western judicial
procedures in non-Western states. Arbitral tribunals have consistently refused to accept the claim that partially nonadversary criminal procedures violate the international minimum standard con2
cerning the right to a fair trial.1
However, to say that cultural identities should be respected does
not mean that international human rights law lacks a substantive
core.2 3 Such a core can be gleaned from international human rights
treaties, both regional and universal, 24 and diplomatic practice, including the relevant practices of international organizations. Indeed, human rights treaties offer a surprisingly uniform articulation of human rights law. They may safely be used as a reference,
regardless of how many or which states are parties.25 The rights,
inter alia, to life, to physical integrity, to a fair trial, freedom of
expression, freedom of thought and religion, freedom of association, and the prohibition against discrimination are all rights upon
which international instruments agree. Unless one wishes to give
up the very notion of an international law of human rights altogether, these rights should have essentially the same meaning re26
gardless of local traditions.

22. Salem Case (Egypt v. U.S.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1161, 1197 (1932); McCurdy Case
(U.S. v. Mexico), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 418 (1929).
23. Schachter, The Charter and the Constitution: The Human Rights Provisions in American Law, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 643, 652 (1951). Cf. M. McDougal, H. Lasswell & C. Chen, supra
note 17, at 5-6 (while different peoples may assert human rights demands in different modalities, a universal insistence on certain basic values exists among all cultures); Kader,
Book Review, 1980 Ariz. St. L.J. 815, 825 (1980) ("The challenge confronting the human
rights movement ... is to recognize and take into account the sociopolitical differences in
the world and yet to resist the relativism which is incompatible with the promotion of universal standards of human rights.").
24. See, e.g., African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples' Rights, Organization of African Unity, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5 (Jan. 1981), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as African Charter]; American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Off.
Records OEA/Ser. K/XVI/1.1, Doc. 65 (1969), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 101 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as American Convention]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as U.N. Covenant]; European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
213 U.N.T.S. 221, 1950 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 71 (Cmd. 8969) (1950) [hereinafter cited as European Convention].
25. As of December 31, 1983, 78 states are parties to the U.N. Covenant, 21 to the European Convention, and 14 to the American Convention. The African Charter is not yet in
force. For the view that the treaties themselves have created human rights obligations to
third "parties, see D'Amato, supra note 17, at 1127-49 nn.70-74.
26. A growing number of Third World scholars reject the relativist approach. See, e.g.,
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I will argue that cultural relativism cannot be reconciled with
the recognition in international law of fundamental rights of the
individual. Part II will demonstrate that positive international law
does not recognize cultural diversity as a justification for the failure to observe human rights. In Part HI, I will argue further that
ethical relativism is a philosophically untenable position. Part IV
includes a brief exposition on and critique of two by-products of
relativism: the elitist and conspiracy theories of human rights. Finally, Part V sets forth some general conclusions.
II. CULTURAL RELATIVISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

A.

CulturalRelativism and the Structure of InternationalLaw

Some commentators have argued that in the absence of centralized international organs, one cannot give a manageable core of
meaning to international human rights norms.27 It may be suggested along these lines that, because the uniform meaning of
human rights advanced by the universalist thesis can be achieved
only in conjunction with international bodies having jurisdiction to
decide conflicting claims regarding the observance of human rights,
relativism best accounts for the realities of contemporary international society.2 This is not a negligible argument. While some encouraging steps are being taken, mainly in regional settings, 29 there
Eisemokhai, Towards Adequate Defense of Human Rights in Africa, 21 Indian J. Int'l L.
141 (1981) (criticizing the failure of African governments to comply with human rights law);
Haile, supra note 17, at 584 (African traditions are not inconsistent with international
human rights law). Some African leaders have also taken a less relativistic position, at least
with regard to basic human rights. See, e.g., the speech of President Julius Nyerere of
Tanzania criticizing African nations that refrained from condemning President Idi Amin of
Uganda on the grounds that Amin was black, 1979 Keesing's Contemporary Archives
29670A (1979) ("blackness has become a certificate to kill with impunity").
27. See Watson, Legal Theory, Efficacy and Validity in the Development of Human
Rights Norms in International Law, 1979 U. ill L.F. 609, 626 (1979).
28. Indeed, centralized systems for the protection of human rights aim to give uniform
meaning to basic rights and freedoms in countries with disparate cultural and legal traditions. The system established by the European Convention provides a striking illustration.
In the Sunday Times Case, the European Court of Human Rights held that the ancient
British institution of contempt of court as applied by British courts was inconsistent with
the freedom of speech guaranteed by the European Convention. Sunday Times Case, 23
Y.B. Eur. Cony. Human Rights 480 (1980) (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights).
29. The creation of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights represents a major development in the human rights enforcement area, particularly because countries like Argentina
have accepted the jurisdiction of the court. See generally Buerghenthal, The Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, 76 Am. J. Int'l L. 231 (1982). The Inter-American Human Rights
Commission, although not endowed with judicial power, has considerable political weight.
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is no doubt that the lack of centralized, compulsive judicial machinery represents a major weakness of current international
human rights law.
This argument, however, is open to two fatal objections. First, it
proves too much. The lack of courts and enforcement agencies
characterizes international law generally, not just the law of human
rights. Therefore, the relativist who leaves human rights out of the
scope of international law solely because of the absence of adjudicatory and enforcement mechanisms ultimately must deny the legal character of international law altogether.3 0
Second, this view overlooks the way that international law
works. Unlike domestic societies where legislatures, courts, and
government agencies create law, law in the international arena results from the subtle interplay of claims, counterclaims, actions
and omissions of many international actors.31 Thus, what nations
do and say, even if they sometimes do not believe it, becomes part
of the raw material from which international law ultimately
springs. This observation rings particularly true in the field of
human rights, precisely because of the absence of enforcement and
judicial bodies. Soviet-bloc countries, for example, cannot join the
critics of the Chilean regime without at the same time opening the
door to criticisms of their own human rights abuses. 3 The process
thus underscores the role of reason in international law. Contrary
to what some realists contend,33 national interest alone cannot support valid international claims. Instead, as is true in all legal discourse, such claims must be supported by principles that are neu-

The same can be said of the U.N. Human Rights Commission, although the primary importance of both commissions stems from their position as forums for the open discussion of
human rights situations. Governments attach great importance to the debates before the
U.N. Human Rights Commission.
30. Although those who deny the "legal" character of international law can point to such
venerable authority as John Austirs The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 201 (ed.
1954), this position has been fully discredited by modern scholars. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart,
The Concept of Law 222-25 (1961).
31. McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, in The Future of the International Legal Order 73 (R. Falk and C. Black eds. 1969).
The "New Haven" approach can be supplemented with the contributions of modern political philosophy. See generally infra notes 79-120 and accompanying text.
32. All of the Soviet-bloc countries voted in favor of the U.N. Resolution on the Protection of Human Rights in Chile, G.A. Res. 3219, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 83, U.N.
Doc. A/9631 (1974).
33. See, e.g., H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations 5-12 (5th rev. ed. 1978).
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tral to individual interests. 4 No authoritative judicial bodies are
needed for this process, though it would be preferable to have
them. The decentralized nature of international law does not,
therefore, preclude the existence of a universal human rights
standard.
B.

CulturalRelativism and the Human Rights Conventions

Supporters of cultural relativism argue that the theory creates a
legal defense to the general duty incumbent upon governments to
observe international human rights. One should therefore expect to
find a provision to that effect in the international legal materials.
Yet, virtually nothing in the human rights conventions suggests
that the respect for human rights depends upon, or can be modified by, local cultural conditions. The U.N. Covenant, the American Convention, and the recent African Charter" do not acknowledge any right of governments to avoid compliance by alleging the
priority of local traditions.
The only apparent exception is article 63(3) of the European
Convention, which states that "[t]he provisions of this Convention
shall be applied in [colonial territories] with due regard, however,
to local requirements."36 If one reads this provision as supporting
cultural relativism, the parties would be exempted from enforcing
the human rights guaranteed by the Convention in those colonial
territories where "local requirements" conflict with the
Convention.
The European Court of Human Rights rejected this interpretation in the Tyrer Case, which involved corporal punishment, a local tradition, on the Isle of Man. The court found that the word
"requirement" embodied the idea of necessity, and that corporal
punishment, no matter how accepted by public opinion and practice or enshrined in the traditions of the Isle, was not necessary to
maintain law and order and consequently ran afoul of the Conven34. The "neutral principles" advocated by Herbert Wechsler in a different context are
narrower in scope, since they refer to constitutional review. Wechsler, Towards Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959). The concern here, more generally, is with claims. The "neutrality" requirement holds even where the principles argued
from are incorrect or nonexistent. Cf. D'Amato, supra note 17, at 1125-27 (human rights are
entitlements of nations which are universal in nature).
35. See supra note 24.
36. European Convention, supra note 24, art. 63(3).
37. Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts., Tyrer Case, Judgment of 25 April 1978, Series A No. 26.
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tion 3 8 Further, the court wrote that no local requirement could enable a party to the Convention to make use of a criminal sanction
in violation of article 3, which prohibits degrading punishment.-"
The Tyrer opinion thus forcefully supports the idea that human
rights are non-negotiable in the sense that not even the force of
overwhelming public opinion or state practice may impair them. It
also stands for the proposition that international human rights
possess a transboundary meaning that cannot be modified or ignored on relativist grounds. The Tyrer court noted that article
63(3) of the European Convention,4 0 drafted in 1950, had been
conceived to meet the European perception about the insufficient
degree of civilization of colonial peoples.4 ' Although the court did
not elaborate on this point, it is doubtful that the relativist interpretation of article 63(3) of the Convention, whereby entire populations are less eligible for protection in the enjoyment of human
rights, conforms to the anti-colonialist values embodied in present
international law.42
In assessing the validity of the relativist doctrine, it is noteworthy that each of the major human rights conventions contains a
nondiscrimination clause. 43 The classical interpretation of such
clauses holds that a government may not discriminate within its
own borders on the basis of race, sex, religion or other impermissible criteria in the enforcement of human rights. 4 The clause is
commonly regarded as operating purely within national borders,
but a broader interpretation is also possible. The nondiscrimination clause arguably forbids governments to treat individuals in
ways that substantially depart from the core of meaning of international human rights law, because such treatment would amount
to discrimination vis-A-vis the treatment enjoyed by individuals in
other states. In other words, one could argue that an individual's
38. Id. at 18.
39. Id.

40. See supra note 24.
41. "The Court notes, in this connection, that the system established by article 63 was
primarily designed to meet the fact that, when the Convention was drafted, there were still
certain colonial territories whose state of civilisation did not, it was thought, permit the full
application of the Convention." Tyrer Case, Judgment at 19.
42. Such a construction would amount to an elitist version of relativism. See infra notes
121-26 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., African Charter, supra note 24, art. 2; American Convention, supra note 24,
art. 24; U.N. Covenant, supra note 24, art. 26; European Convention, supra note 24, art. 14.
44. See, e.g., Belgian Linguistics Case, 11 Y.B. Eur. Cony. Human Rights 832, 862-69
(1968) (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights).
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entitlement to human rights does not depend on the particular traditions of the state in which the individual is located, that national
boundaries do not affect the imperative of nondiscrimination.
The thrust of article 1(3) of the U.N. Charter is no different. It
states that a major purpose of the organization is to achieve international cooperation in encouraging and promoting "respect for
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language and religion.4 51 To interpret the
clause "for all" to mean for all individuals on earth, and not just
for all individuals within a given state, surely violates neither the
letter nor the spirit of the Charter. Suppose, for example, states A
and B conclude a human rights treaty that contains a nondiscrimination clause. It is insufficient to say that within state A there
should be no discrimination based on sex, race, and the like. The
nondiscrimination clause must also be read to have a transboundary dimension. Accordingly, the rights enjoyed by individuals in state A cannot differ substantially in content and scope from
those enjoyed by individuals in state B. Otherwise the human
rights treaty would be redundant, at least insofar as the principle
of nondiscrimination already existed in those states as a matter of
municipal or constitutional law.4
C.

Cultural Relativism and Self-Determination

One may object to the foregoing analysis on the grounds that
human rights treaties only bind the parties, 4'7 and that the status
of cultural relativism in international law cannot be ascertained
from treaty analysis alone. It is therefore necessary to determine
whether customary international law supports the claims of the
cultural relativists. The principles of self-determination and nonintervention offer, at first glance, possible legal support for the rela-

45. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3 (emphasis added).

46. Admittedly, the interpretation of the nondiscrimination clause suggested in the text is
a novel one. But if we accept that the international legal system primarily entrusts the
application of human rights law to states, and if we further accept that individuals are the
beneficiaries of such law, then it becomes clear that violations premised upon cultural traditions represent transboundary discriminatory treatment. To put it differently, the relativist
contention that freedom of religion, for example, means one thing in the West and a different thing in the Third World, requires a discriminatory application of human rights law.
47. See, e.g., the statement of the Chilean representative to the U.N. General Assembly
Third Committee, 31 U.N. GAOR C.3 (46th rntg.) paras. 1-25, U.N. Doe. A/C.3/311SR.46
(1976) (rejecting case law under the European Convention, supra note 24, regarding the

Emergency Clause as irrelevant to the Chilean situation).
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tivist doctrine. 48 A closer consideration of these principles reveals,
however, that this support is only illusory.
Ascertainment of the precise contours of the self-determination
principle is not easy.49 In addition to the important anti-colonialist
aspect of self-determination, 50 an internal dimension appears to
exist as well.51 Article 2 of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 2 ("Declaration of
Colonial Independence"), widely regarded as embodying customary
law concerning self-determination, provides that "[a]ll peoples
have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their eco5' 3
nomic, social and cultural development.
Commentators espouse two conflicting interpretations of this
clause. The democratic, anti-authoritarian view holds that internal
self-determination requires internal democracy and respect for the
human rights of all peoples.54 This thesis finds support in the intent of the framers of the U.N. Charter,55 and arguably reflects a
correct reading of the self-determination principle as agreed upon

48. For a brief and lucid account of the role played by self-determination concerns in the
development of the Third World's distrust toward the human rights movement, see Nickel,
Cultural Diversity and Human Rights, in International Human Rights: Contemporary Issues
43, 43-46 (J. Nelson & V. Green eds. 1980).
49. See generally M. Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice 1-28 (1982).
50. External self-determination means the right of peoples to decide their international
status. It represents an expression of modern anti-colonialist values in the international
community. The literature on external self-determination is voluminous. See references in
id. at 130-38.
51. See id. at 37 nn.209-11.
52. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A.
Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960) [hereinafter cited
as Declaration of Colonial Independence].
53. Id. This provision is echoed by the Declaration on Principles, supra note 21, art. 1
("all peoples have the right freely to determine, without external interference, their political
status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development"), and by the U.N.
Covenant, supra note 24, art. 1 ("All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development.").
54. See Moore, Grenada and the International Double Standard, 78 Am. J. Int'l L. 145,
154-56, 165 (1984) (Grenada mission was designed to restore self-determination, in the form
of democratic rights, to the Grenadian people); Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination:
Construing Charter Article 2(4), 78 Am. J. Int'l L. 642, 643-44 (1984) ("Ongoing self-determination [works] to increase the probability of the free choice of peoples about their government and political structure."); Rosenstock, The Declaration of Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations: A Survey, 65 Am. J. Int'l L. 713, 732 (1971).
55. See Cassese, The Helsinki Declaration and Self-Determination, in Human Rights, International Law and the Helsinki Accord 83, 84 (T. Buergenthal ed. 1977).
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by the European states in the Helsinki Accord. 6 Under this interpretation, the word "freely" means "free from internal, as well as
from external, interference." The right of self-determination in international law would thus represent an expression of the entitlement of all individuals to democratic representative government
and to basic human rights.57
The relativist version of the rule embodied in article 2 of the
Declaration of Colonial Independence differs radically from the
one expressed above. According to this view, internal self-determination represents the flip side of the nonintervention principle: it
forbids any state from interfering with the cultural and political
choices of autonomous peoples. 58 Self-determination in this sense
represents the rights-language version of the duty of nonintervention in internal affairs. People have the right to create whatever
form of government they want, no matter how repressive, and
human rights claims put forward by other states may not interfere
with the fulfillment of this right. Under this view, a people exhausts its right to self-determination when it achieves the status of
a sovereign state. 59 Once the people choose a political and cultural
system, nothing in international law confers a right to change the
system. 0 Under this construction, internal self-determination

56. Id. at 99-105.
57. Some Western states defended this position in the negotiations that led to the 1970
Declaration on Principles, supra note 21. The proposals presented by the United Kingdom
and the United States suggested that representative government was essential for the realization of the right to self-determination. See U.N. Doc. AIAC.125/L44, July 19, 1967
(United Kingdom draft); U.N. Doc. A/AC.125/L.32, Apr. 12, 1966 (U.S. draft). In fact, some
support for this position may be found in the final wording of the Declaration on Principles,
supra note 21, at 123: "[A]ll peoples have the right freely to determine, without external
interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development." (emphasis added). Arguably, the word "freely" means "without internal interference," or else it would be superfluous. Contra Cassese, supra note 55, at 89-90 (Declaration
only requires internal self-determination in cases involving racist regimes or foreign domination, in contrast with the Helsinki declaration).
58. See Mojekwu, International Human Rights: The African Perspective, in International
Human Rights, supra note 48, at 89 ('Self-determination... would involve the right of a
people to take into their hands the full responsibility of determining, without coercion, their
own political, economic and cultural destiny."). Obviously, "coercion" here means external
coercion. Mojekwu's definition clearly tolerates internal coercion, Le., human rights violations without foreign interference.
59. This is the official position of Soviet-bloc countries. See Poeggel, 1 Volkerrecht (Manual of International Law of the German Democratic Republic) 270 (1973), cited in Cassese,
supra note 55, at 85 n.7.
60. The Soviet Union and its allies defended this view during the 1975 Helsinki negotiations. See Cassese, supra note 55, at 99. This position does not simply reflect tactical "power
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means that no state may impose a cultural or political system on
people living beyond its borders.6 1
However, this version of internal self-determination is at best a
misconception, and at worst it can be a rationalization for oppression. First, a contextual interpretation of the Declaration of Colonial Independence yields a very different result. The preamble of
the Declaration recalls the commitment of the peoples of the world
to "fundamental human rights" and to "the dignity and worth of
the human person. ' '62 The same argument applies a fortiori to the
self-determination principle embodied in article 1 of the U.N. Cov0 4
enant,6 3 which exactly reproduces article 2 of the Declaration.
The relativist interpretation of article 1 grants people "the right to
freely . . . pursue their economic, social and cultural development" 65 even where that pursuit would reduce to meaninglessness
the remaining fifty-one articles of the Covenant. A more reasonable approach, consistent with sound treaty interpretation, would
dictate that the principle of independent cultural development as a
part of self-determination be harmonized with human rights law."6
Further, the relativist version of internal self-determination
often defines the interests of a people in mystical or aggregative
terms that ignore or belittle individual preferences. Such mystical
definitions may be articulated in the form of axiomatic "true" interests of peoples, as opposed to real or expressed interests. 67 They

politics" devices. It is strongly linked to the Leninist conception that the "true" interest of
the people can only be expressed by, and result in, the dictatorship of the proletariat. See
M. Pomerance, supra note 49, at 40.
61. The proviso "beyond its borders" is crucial, because according to a widespread view,
self-determination does not grant rights (of secession or otherwise) to minorities within a
sovereign state. See generally Nanda, Self-Determination under International Law: Validity
of Claims to Secede, 13 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 257 (1981). Thus, many governments (not
only those of the Soviet-bloc) hold the inconsistent view that cultural standards determine
the scope of human rights, and that minorities within a sovereign state are not entitled to
choose their own political institutions and pursue their independent cultural development.
62. Declaration of Colonial Independence, supra note 52, preamble.
63. U.N. Covenant, supra note 24.
64. See supra text accompanying note 53.
65. U.N. Covenant, supra note 24, art. 1.
66. See, e.g., the draft proposed by the Dutch delegation to the Helsinki conference:
The participating States recognize the inalienable right of the people of every
State freely to choose, to develop, to adapt or to change its political, economic,
social and cultural systems without interference in any form by any other State
or group of States and with due respect to human rights and fundamental
freedoms.
Doc. CSCE/II/A/8, cited by Cassese, supra note 55, at 96 (emphasis added).
67. See supra note 60.
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may also be expressed as a plain rule of political power, whereby

those in power automatically are deemed to represent the people,
regardless of whether they have been democratically elected and
regardless of their human rights record. Consequently, a relativist
would maintain that in Pinochet's takeover in Chile or Ho Chi
Minh's takeover in Vietnam, the peoples of Chile and Vietnam exercised their right of self-determination, and that the governments
so formed are immune from foreign interference even when they
deprive people of human rights. It may well be that self-determination, external or internal, exists only as a collective right that
can be exercised jointly by individuals.68 It is equally true, however, that self-determination is a human right, not a right of governments, whether they are headed by charismatic revolutionary
leaders or military dictators.6 9 Therefore, the right to self-determination must ultimately be ascertained by reference to the wishes
and rights of individuals. 70 As Professor Schachter has convincingly argued, the concept of human dignity implies that high priority should be given to individual choices in ways of life, beliefs and
the conduct of public affairs. 71 This concept, however, simple as it
is, clearly contradicts many existing ideologies and political
arrangements. 2
Finally, a consideration of the concerns which prompted the development of the self-determination principle also leads to a rejection of the relativist thesis. The self-determination principle has
traditionally been directed against colonialism and various tangible

.68. See Dinstein, Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities, 25 Int'l & Comp. L.
Q. 102, 103 (1976).
69. Professor Dinstein aptly cautions that "collective human rights retain their character
as direct human rights. The group which enjoys them communally is not a corporate entity
and does not possess a legal personality." Id.
70. "The state must protect the individual citizen, its units or atoms; but the international organization also must ultimately protect human individuals, and not its units or
atoms, i.e., states or nations." 1 K. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies 288 n.7
(1966) (emphasis added). See also Luban, The Romance of the Nation-State, 9 Phil. & Pub.
Aff. 392 (1980) (arguing against the "rights" emphasized by nationalism). Under the relativist version of internal self-determination, the term "state will" does not mean the sum of the
individual wills, because then governments would never act against the popular will-which
is obviously not the case. "State will," instead, means what the government decides. Relativism asks us to believe that the government necessarily represents the people, and that the
government always acts as a surrogate for the "people." The authoritarianism embodied in
this notion of "state will" is clearly incompatible with respect for human rights, and must
therefore be rejected.
71. Schachter, Human Dignity as a Normative Concept. 77 Am. J. Int'l L 848, 849 (1983).
72. Id. at 850.
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forms of foreign domination. 73 It primarily guarantees to people
the right to establish their own government and pursue their cultural development without external interference."4 Yet external
pressure for human rights compliance has nothing to do with colonial domination, imperialism and the other evils against which
self-determination was conceived. An analysis of the purposive dimension of self-determination, therefore, provides no support for
the relativist doctrine.
As to the nonintervention principle, there is broad support today
for the proposition that discussing human rights does not amount
to "intervention" within the meaning of article 2(7) of the U.N.
Charter, 75 unless one takes the position-discarded at the begin-

ning of this study-that human rights are not part of international
law.76 For the relativist, the nonintervention principle and internal
self-determination have identical content. Saying that people may
choose whatever government they want is the same as saying that
other states may not intervene to criticize human rights violations.7 Thus, mutatis mutandi, the same arguments marshalled in
the previous paragraphs apply. 8
In sum, under international law, all individuals, regardless of
their state of origin, residence, and cultural environment, are entitled to fundamental human rights. International law does not relieve governments of the obligation to respect these rights simply
because a particular right is inconsistent with local traditions.

73. See supra note 50.
74. See generally M. Pomerance, supra note 49, at 9-28. The Declaration of Colonial Independence, supra note 52, emphasizes decolonization and independence, which suggests an
"externalist" approach to self-determination.
75. See generally R. Higgins, The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations 118 (1963); Gilmour, The Meaning of "Intervene" Within
Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter-An Historical Perspective, 16 Int'l & Comp. L.
Q. 330 (1967).
76. Contra Watson, Autointerpretation, Competence and the Continuing Validity of Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter, 71 Am. J. Int'l L. 60 (1977). Whether international law supports military intervention to protect human rights under certain circumstances is a far
more difficult problem. It is the subject of extensive discussion in my forthcoming S.J.D.
dissertation, "Humanitarian Intervention in International Law."
77. See Cassese, supra note 55, at 85-86.
78. See supra notes 47-74 and accompanying text. The Argentine military junta used the
principle of nonintervention as its main defense against human rights criticisms. The
U.S.S.R. also frequently invokes it. Schreman, Gorbachev Meets the Press: A Bantering
Style and an Echo of Krushchev, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1985, at 4, col. 2.
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Il.

CULTURAL RELATIVISM AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY

This part of the paper addresses the philosophical status of cultural relativism. After outlining the link between human rights law
and moral philosophy, I draw a distinction between several types
of relativism. Ultimately, I reject relativism on the grounds that it
violates formal and substantive constraints of moral discourse.
A. Moral Philosophy and Human Rights Law
The law of human rights borrows its language from moral philosophy. From its inception at the end of World War II, the modern
international law of human rights has been indissolubly linked
with the moral concerns prompted by the Nazi horrors. The statesmen who drafted the U.N. Charter were motivated in part by the
moral imperative to restore human dignity and give it legal status,
and indeed that moral concern permeates the subsequent develop9
7
ment of human rights law.

At the same time, the framers of the Charter also worried about
problems of conflict avoidance, peace, security, and maintaining
the balance of power. Paradoxically, while national sovereignty
continues to be strongly asserted both inside and outside the confines of the United Nations, human rights law has developed impressively.80 Indeed, reconciling national sovereignty and the international law of human rights remains one of the central challenges
of our times.8 1 Despite serious problems of enforcement, the dyna-

mism. of human rights groups throughout the world and the pressure exerted on delinquent governments by democratic nations has
achieved remarkable results, demonstrating that the belief in
human rights is not a mere illusion created by scholars, but an effective and living tool for political reform. 2
79. See Sohn, supra note 2, at 9-14.
80. See Vincent-Daviss, Human Rights Law Research Guides, supra note 2.
81. Cf. Delbrueck, International Protection of Human Rights and State Sovereignty, 57
Ind. L. J. 567 (1982) ("[T]he sovereign states not only are creating the international norms
for the protection of human rights, but also are determining the process of their implementation-or nonimplementation-according to their sovereign will. Seen from this perspective, state sovereignty and the international protection of human rights appear to be
incompatible.").
82. Sometimes the importance of the pressure exerted by democratic governments is erroneously downplayed. I can personally attest that President Carter's human rights policy
saved thousands of lives in Argentina. Human rights organizations also play a significant
role, despite justified criticisms of occasional one-sidedness. See generally Weissbrodt, Strategies for the Selection and Pursuit of International Human Rights Objectives, 8 Yale J.
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Another reason for focusing on moral philosophy is that the concern for human rights did not grow from a desire to force governments to comply with the law "as it is." The world regards human
rights violations as a moral wrong of the most serious nature, and
presumably continues to condemn such practices even though
technically the accused government has not violated any unambiguous positive international obligation. Given the intimate historical
and conceptual connection between international human rights law
and morality and the current emphasis of some writers on relativism as a supposed basis of the contemporary world order,8 3 it is
important to examine the conclusions about cultural relativism
8 4
that can be gleaned from moral philosophy.
B.

Descriptive, Metaethical, and Normative Relativism

To analyze the moral status of relativism, several types of relativism must be carefully distinguished. 5 First, different societies
have different perceptions of right and wrong. This assertion-which may be called "descriptive" relativism-finds support
among anthropologists who consider themselves relativists."0 Although descriptive relativism has been challenged, 7 its validity
may be conceded for the purposes of the present analysis.
The second type of relativism, "metaethical" relativism, asserts
that it is impossible to discover moral truth. Metaethical relativism
may take the form of a thesis about the meaning of moral terms. 8
The relativist can adopt either some version of emotivism8 9 or a

World Pub. Ord. 62 (1981).
83. See generally E. McWhinney, supra note 5. While McWhinney's conception of relativism is broader, it encompasses the one treated here.
84. The relevance of moral inquiry to international law depends, of course, upon one's
particular theory of the relation between law and morality. However, if the relativist concedes that his theory is not supported by independent moral reasoning, he must conclude
that cultural relativism, although technically legal, is immoral, and he is therefore logically
committed to the reform of international law in the sense of eliminating the relativist
defense.
85. See Brandt, Ethical Relativism, in 3 Encyclopedia of Philosophy 75 (P. Edwards ed.
1967).
86. See, e.g., M. Herskovits, supra note 6, at 61-78.
87. The debate centers on whether fundamental diversities of ethical views exist in different societies. See Brandt, supra note 85, at 75.

88. Id. at 75.
89. Emotivism holds that moral propositions are no more than interjections or emotive
utterances. See generally, A. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (1946); C.L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language (1944).
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straight nihilist position.

0

A milder version of metaethical relativ-

ism contends that there is no valid method for moral reasoning-that is, no method that would have, on moral matters, the
same persuasive force as scientific method."1
Finally, "normative" relativism asserts that persons, depending
on their cultural attachments, ought to do different things and
have different rights.9 2 This is the version of relativism equivalent
to the one discussed in Part H of this study. 3 It should be clear
that descriptive and metaethical relativism do not logically entail
normative relativism. Descriptive relativism operates at a different
logical level than its normative counterpart. The anthropologist or
descriptive relativist says that different cultures in fact have different conceptions of morality. The normative relativist asserts that
individuals of different cultures have different rights, and that
they ought to do or to abstain from doing different things. It is
therefore perfectly possible for the descriptive relativist to concede
that different societies have different social practices and conflicting views about morality and yet consider some practices or views
morally preferable to others. 4
The relationship between metaethical and normative relativism
is more complex, but the two theories are still logically distinguishable. The metaethical relativist doubts the possibility of demonstrating the correctness of any particular moral principle. As a
matter of moral decision, he may reject normative relativism while
denying that any moral principle or system is demonstrably correct. To create a framework within which to make moral judgments, the metaethical relativist nevertheless has an option: he
may subscribe to the "reflective equilibrium" method suggested by
John Rawls. 95 Rawls devised a framework within which to make

90. Nihilism, in this context, holds that moral terms lack any meaning whatsoever.
91. Brandt, supra note 85, at 76.
92. See E. Westermarck, supra note 6, ch. 5; Benedict, Anthropology and the Abnormal,
10 J. Gen. Psych. 59 (1934). Even "relativism" is too charitable a name for this theory,
which may properly be called "moral positivism." See the brilliant critique in 2 K. Popper,
supra note 70, ch. 12, 392-96.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 10-13.
94. See Douglas, Morality and Culture, 93 Ethics 786 (1983) ('"Two conversations are running parallel, one the philosophers', about the rational formulation of ethics, one the anthropologists', about the interaction between moral ideas and social institutions. The conversations, as they are set at the present time, will never converge.").
95. J. Rawls, supra note 15, at 48-51. Of course, the acceptance of reflective equilibrium
as a plausible description of moral methodology is completely independent from (a) the
acceptance of Rawls' contractarian justification for principles of social justice; (b) the ac-
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meaningful moral judgments without encountering the problem of
demonstration. He suggests that moral conclusions may be reached
by checking one's moral intuitions against one's moral principles
with the crucial proviso that both be subject to modification." At
the very least, Rawls demonstrates that it is unnecessary to have
an infallible method of discovering moral truth in order to speak
about the rights all people should enjoy.
C.

Critique of Normative Relativism

As a moral theory, normative relativism cannot withstand scrutiny. 7 First, its straightforward formulation reflects a fundamental
incoherence. It affirms at the same time that (a) there are no universal moral principles; (b) one ought to act in accordance with the
principles of one's own group; and (c), (b) is a universal moral
principle." David Lyons demonstrated that the typical anthropologists' version of relativism ("an act is right if, and only if, it accords with the norms of the agent's group") does not validate conflicting moral judgments, because each group is regarded as a
separate moral realm.9 9 Consequently, the incoherence attached to
normative relativism springs from the fact that the very assertion
of universal relativism is self-contradictory, not from the fact that
it validates conflicting substantive moral judgments. If it is true
that no universal moral principles exist, then the relativist engages
in self-contradiction by stating the universality of the relativist
principle. 100 As Bernard Williams observed, this is a "logically un-

ceptance of the principles themselves; or (c) the acceptance of his solution to the priority
problem. For Rawls' view that "undeveloped" societies may fail to observe human rights in
certain situations, see infra note 109.
96. J. Rawls, supra note 15, at 48.

97. Bernard Williams calls relativism "the anthropologists' heresy, possibly the most absurd view to have been advanced even in moral philosophy." B. Williams, Morality: An
Introduction to Ethics 20 (1972).

98. Id. at 20-21; Lyons, Ethical Relativism and the Problem of Incoherence, 86 Ethics
107, 109 (1975-76).
99. Lyons, supra note 98, at 109.
100. This problem resembles the one exhibited by ideologism, the theory that everything
is ideology, which for some mysterious reason does not apply to itself. This paper will not
deal with Gilbert Harman's narrower version of moral relativism because Harman intended
for his version to apply only to "inner" judgments, i.e., judgments that someone who had
already settled upon a moral code ought or ought not to have acted in a certain way. His
theory does not apply to the judgment that a given institution is unjust, which is most
relevant for the purposes of this paper. Harman, Moral Relativism Defended, 84 Phil. Rev.
3, 4 (1975). See the critique of Harman's theory by Copp, Harman on Internalism, Relativ-

ism and Logical Form, 92 Ethics 227 (1981-82).
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happy attachment of a nonrelative morality of toleration or noninterference to a view of morality as relative."1 01
However, this objection over the incoherence of normative relativism is not decisive. Normative relativism can be reformulated to
avoid the threat of incoherence as follows: (a) there are no universal moral principles, save one; (b) one ought to act in accordance
with the principles of one's own group; and (c) the only universal
moral principle is (b).10 2 Yet, if the normative relativist is also a
metaethical relativist, he cannot justify why (b) is a universal
moral principle. If the relativist has a method of discovering universal moral principles-for example, Rawls' "reflective equilibrium" or the utilitarian principle-then it is difficult to see why
the only principle yielded by such method would be (b) above.
Thus, this new version of relativism avoids inconsistency, but it is
epistemologically weak.
A second problem with normative relativism is that it overlooks
10 3
an important feature of moral discourse, its universalizability.
Independently of substantive morals, when we talk about right and
wrong or rights and duties, and act accordingly, we are logically
committed to "act in accordance with the generic rights of [our]
recipients as well as of [our]selves," on pain of self-contradiction.104 This not only means that we cannot make exceptions in our
own favor, but also that individuals must be treated as equally entitled to basic rights regardless of contingent factors such as their
cultural surroundings. The requirement of universalizability may
be thought of as having a logical nature,1 0 5 or alternatively, as be-

101. B. Williams, supra note 97, at 21. See also a profound criticism of relativism in B.
Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, ch. 9 (1985).

102. I am grateful to David Kaye for demonstrating this point to me.
103. The requirement of universalizability is usually traced to IV L Kant, Critique of

Practical Reason § 436 (L. Beck trans. 1949). It has been revived in recent philosopical
literature, mainly by A. Gewirth, Reason and Morality (1978) and M. Singer, Generalization
in Ethics (1961).

104. A. Gewirtb, Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Application 52, 128.41
(1982).

105. See id. at 89; IV .Kant, supra note 103, § 436 ("All maxims have... a form, which
consists in universality, and in this respect the formula of the moral imperative requires

that the maxims be chosen as though they should hold as universal laws of nature.'; M.
Singer, supra note 103, at 34 ("The generalization principle..,

is involved in or presup-

posed by every genuine moral judgment, for it is an essential part of.. .distinctively moral
terms."); Frankena, The Concept of Morality, 63 J. Phil. 688, 695-96 (1966). Professor
D'Amato makes a convincing linguistic case against relativism, showing that when we ordinarily refer to some conduct as "moral," we usually mean that it is universally valid. Conversely, when we are prepared to be tolerant about some conduct (for example, sexual hab-

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 25:4

ing a requirement of moral plausibility.1 06 If the first approach is
correct, the relativist simply refuses to engage in meaningful moral
discourse. Under the second approach, the relativist endorses the
highly implausible position that in moral matters we can pass
judgments containing proper names, and that consequently we
107
may make exceptions in our own favor.
The relativist has two responses to the universalizability argument. First, the relativist may argue that belonging to different
communities is a morally relevant circumstance.1 0 8 Universalizability, he would argue, is not violated when individuals are situated in different factual conditions. To say that if A ought to do X
in circumstances C, then B also ought to do X in circumstances C,
presupposes a similarity of circumstances. If such circumstances
vary substantially, that is, if cultural traditions, creeds, and practices differ, then we would not violate the universalizability requirement by holding that individuals who belong to different cultures ought to have different basic rights. 09 Sometimes relativists
articulate this position in the form of an attack on the assertion of
the existence of abstract rights, as opposed to the assertion of concrete rights and duties in materially defined social conditions. 110

its), we regard such conduct as "mores" or "custom," and not as "morality in the stronger
sense." D'Amato, Lon Fuller and Substantive Natural Law, 26 Am. J. Juris. 202, 204 (1981).
106. See, e.g., J. Rawls, supra note 15, at 132 (principles apply to everyone by virtue of
their being moral persons).
107. See J. Hospers, Human Conduct 276-77, 285 (1972).
108. See the elementary but excellent discussion in id. at 283-90.
109. John Rawls asserts that in societies which have not attained certain minimal material conditions, individuals may be denied human rights. J. Rawls, supra note 15, at 151-52.
This seems a surprising statement in the context of Rawls' impressive defense of the
"rights" conception of justice. As Brian Barry put it:
Why this should be so is not at all clear to me. Is there anything in the material
condition of, say, a group of nomadic Bedouin eking a bare subsistence from the
desert or a population of poor peasant cultivators which prevents them from
being able to use personal liberty?
B. Barry, supra note 15, at 77.
In his most recent article, Rawls expressly refused to deal with the issue of whether his
theory "can be extended to a general political conception for different kinds of societies
existing under different historical and social conditions." Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, 14 Phil. & Pub. AfM. 223, 225 (1985). It would be unfair, however, to
charge Rawls with yielding to relativism, since he expressly avoids "prejudging one way or
the other." Id.
110. See Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1363, 1364-65 (1984) ("It does not
advance understanding to speak of rights in the abstract. It matters only that some specific
right is or is not recognized in some specific social setting. . . .In this way rights become
identified with particular cultures and are relativized."). Tushnet's article astonishes in several regards. For example, he states that "[t]he use of rights in contemporary discourse
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Such arguments are flawed, however, because the fact that one
belongs to a particular social group or community is not a morally
relevant circumstance. The place of birth and cultural environment
of an individual are not related to his moral worth or to his entitlement to human rights. An individual cannot be held responsible
for being born in one society rather than in another, for one "deserves" neither one's cultural environment nor one's place of birth.
There is nothing, for example, in the nature of a Third World woman that makes her less eligible for the enjoyment of human rights
(though she may, of course, consensually waive her rights) than a
woman in a Western democracy.""1 If the initial conditions are not
morally distinguishable, the requirement of universalizability fully
applies to statements about individual rights, even where the
agents are immersed in different cultural environments.
The relativist's first objection to universalizability also confuses
the circumstances in which one learns moral concepts with the
meaning of those concepts.1 2 A person who learns a moral concept
(such as that of "wrong") by applying it in fact situations peculiar
to his culture, is perfectly able to apply that concept to a set of
facts he has never encountered before. As Bernard Williams said in
his most recent work:
The fact that people can and must react when they are
confronted with another culture, and do so by applying
their existing notions-also by reflecting on them-seems
to show that the ethical thought of a given culture can
always stretch beyond its boundaries. Even if there is no
way inwhich divergent ethical beliefs can be brought to
converge by independent inquiry or rational argument,

impedes advances by progressive social forces." Id. at 1364. Such criticism, of course, assumes that it is morally desirable for the "progressive social forces" (whatever that means)

to dictate conducts and impose ends and conceptions of moral excellence on other individuals (i.e., on those who presumably would be accused of militating in the ranks of the "regres-

sive social forces"). John Rawls artfully responded to this assertion in an oft-quoted sentence: "Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of
society as a whole cannot override." J. Rawls, supra note 15, at 3. This is what I mean by
"rights" in the "abstract." See also infra text accompanying notes 116-17.
111. One must be careful not to overstate this exception. Dictators typically assert that
they represent the people or that they have their support. Even if a particular dictator
enjoys popular support, however, such support does not entitle him to oppress dissenters
who have not consented to his rule. The majoritarian principle is thus useless when assessing human rights violations. See the discussion in J. Rawls, supra note 15, at 356-62.
112. See R. Trigg, Reason and Commitment 20 (1973).
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this fact will not imply relativism. Each outlook may still
be making claims it intends to apply to the whole world,
113
not just to that part of it which is its 'own world.'
By claiming that moral judgments only have meaning within particular cultures, the relativist underestimates the ability of the
human intellect to confront, in a moral sense, new situations.
The relativist's second objection to universalizability has a logical nature. As noted above, the relativist may contend that (a) his
only principle is that culture determines human rights; and (b), (a)
is universal. 114 The relativist thus universalizes a principle. But the
requirement of universalizability applies to substantive moral
statements, which (a) is not. The principle that culture determines
human rights is a principle of renvoi; that is, it refers us to different normative systems in order to determine the rights of individuals. The principle does not establish rules governing the rights of
any particular individual. Universalizability requires that if we
make a statement about the right of X to freedom of thought, we
are committed to grant that right to Y under similar, morally relevant circumstances. Because the relativist principle does not address issues of substantive morality in this respect, it is not susceptible to being universalized in the same way. The violation of
universalizability becomes apparent when one translates the relativist principle into substantive moral statements (i.e., X, who lives
in culture C1, has the right R; while Y, who lives in culture C2,
does not have the right R). In other words, the relativist principle
may be regarded as metamoral, even where it is asserted as the
11 5
basis of normative morality.
Third, normative relativism runs counter to the principle that
persons have moral worth qua persons and must be treated as ends
in themselves, not as functions of the ends of others-a non-trivial
version of the Kantian principle of autonomy."' This principle of
moral worth forbids the imposition upon individuals of cultural

113. B. Williams, supra note 101, at 159.
114. See supra text accompanying note 102.

115. The characterization of relativism as metamoral differs from the assertion of
metaethical relativism. This part of the paper deals with normative relativism, which does
not need support from metaethical skepticism. See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying
text. But normative relativism is still not strictly a substantive moral theory. It only tells us
where to look for the norms that determine individual rights.

116. See Ping-Cheung Lo, A Critical Reevaluation of the Alleged "Empty Formalism" of
Kantian Ethics, 91 Ethics 181, 182 (1980-81). See also Schachter, supra note 71, at 849.
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standards that impair human rights. Even if relativists could show
that authoritarian practices are somehow required by a community-a claim which in many cases remains to be proven-they
would still fail to explain why individuals should surrender their
basic rights to the ends of the community. If women in Moslem
countries are discriminated against, it is not enough to say that a
tradition, no matter how old and venerable, requires such discrimination.11 7 The only defense consistent with the principle of autonomy would be a showing that each subjugated woman consented to
waive her rights. However, because of the mysticial and holistic assumptions underlying relativism, presumably the relativist would
not regard such a test as relevant or necessary.
Quite apart from the moral implausibility of normative relativism, it is worth noting the extreme conservatism of the doctrine.1 18

Normative relativism tells us that if a particular society has always
had authoritarian practices, it is morally defensible that it continue to have them. It works as a typical argument of authority: it
has always been like this, this is our culture, so we need not undertake any changes. 9 In the final analysis, normative relativism thus
conceived amounts to the worst form of moral and legal positivism:

117. For examples see supra note 10.
118. A similar point is made by Amy Gutman in her response to modem critics of liberalism. Gutman, Communitarian Critics of Liberalism, 14 Phil. & Pub. Aft. 308, 309 (1985).
As the text demonstrates, anti-liberal theories that emphasize the priority of communal values are necessarily relativist.
119. Tushnet asserts that his radical critique of rights "is a Schumpeterian act of creative
destruction that may help us to build societies that transcend the failures of capitalism."
Tushnet, supra note 110, at 1363. Tushnet later expressed this idea in relativistic terms:
"The critique of rights takes a strong relativist position: it insists that rights-talk is meaningful only when placed within a full social and legal context." Id. at 1394. Thus, relativism
to Tushnet is a basic assumption of radical politics, an essential underpinning of left-wing
scholarship and politics. Yet nothing is farther from the truth. Relativism is tantamount to
moral positivism and to "legalism," two of the most reactionary doctrines in the history of
ideas. Tushnet himself seems to realize this. He tells us that "to say that some specific right
is (or ought to be) recognized in a specific culture is to say that the culture is what it is,
ought to recognize what its deepest commitments are, or ought to be transformed into some
other culture." Id. at 1365. Thus, for Tushnet the only way to talk about rights is to describe rights as they are recognized by this or that culture. Those are the only existing
rights. True, he accepts that we can say that this culture "ought to be transformed into
some other culture." He thus avoids the charge of moral positivism. But because he has
been precluded from even talking about rights in the abstract, be loses the best and most
effective philosophical tool for criticizing positive law- the idea that individuals have rights
independent of contingent cultural standards. Thus, when criticizing a particular culture, a
Tushnet-type relativist may not rely on the proposition that individuals are entitled to some
other social arrangement or that their rights have been violated.
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it asserts that the rules enacted by the group are necessarily correct as a matter of critical morality. 120 If there is a particularly unfit domain for arguments of authority, it is surely that of human
rights.
Admittedly, the force of the moral critique of relativism articulated here depends on the intuitive acceptance of certain moral
premises. The relativist can successfully resist the attack by rejecting metaethical relativism so as to avoid logical incoherence,
denying that universalizability is an ingredient of moral judgments, and rejecting the principle of autonomy. But this is a high
price to pay. Normative relativism would then be a poor and implausible moral doctrine, and it is doubtful that many relativists,
upon careful reflection, would accept the harsh implications. Furthermore, cultural relativism as defined in the first part of this article expressly or impliedly assumes the validity of normative relativism. Not only does positive international law fail to provide any
basis for the relativist doctrine, but the underlying philosophical
structure of relativism also reveals profound flaws.
IV. Two BY-PRODUCTS OF RELATIVISM: ELITISM AND CONSPIRACY
In this Part I will briefly consider two doctrines closely associated with relativism. The first theory asserts that one can appropriately honor human rights in certain societies, usually the most
sophisticated ones, but not in others, on account, for example, of
the latter's insufficient economic development. This doctrine,
which can be called "elitism," necessarily follows from relativism.
The second theory states that the law of human rights results from
a conspiracy of the West to perpetuate imperialism. The "conspiracy theory," by contrast, does not follow inevitably from, and is
not required by, cultural relativism.
A.

The Elitist Theory of Human Rights

During the dark years of the military dictatorship in Argentina,
one commonly heard many well-intentioned commentators exclaiming: "It is really a shame! Argentina, a country that springs

120. See supra note 92. This indictment only attacks what Professor Carlos Nino has
called "ideological positivism," the theory that the norms of a group are necessarily correct
as a matter of critical morality. C. Nino, Introduccion al Analisis del Derecho 32-35 (1980).
This paper is not concerned with the more fertile concept of "methodological positivism,"
the theory of the separation between law and morality defended by H.L.A. Hart and others.
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from Western tradition, cannot be excused for not respecting
human rights." The statement implies that countries that do not
spring from a Western tradition may somehow be excused from
complying with the international law of human rights. This elitist
theory of human rights holds that human rights are good for the
West but not for much of the non-Western world.1 2 ' Surprisingly,
the elitist theory of human rights is very popular in the democratic
West, not only in conservative circles but also, and even more
often, among liberal and radical groups. 12 2 The right-wing version

of elitism embodies the position, closely associated with colonialism, that backward peoples cannot govern themselves and that democracy only works for superior cultures.1

23

The left-wing version,

often articulated by liberals who stand for civil rights in Western
countries but support leftist dictatorships abroad, reflects a belief
that we should be tolerant of and respect the cultural identity and
political self-determination of Third World countries (although, of
course, it is seldom the people who choose to have dictators; more
often the dictators decide for them).' 2 '
The position of relativist scholars who are human rights advocates illustrates an eloquent example of concealed elitism. 25 Such
persons find themselves in an impossible dilemma. On the one
hand they are anxious to articulate an international human rights
standard, while on the other they wish to respect the autonomy of
individual cultures. The result is a vague warning against "ethnocentrism,' 1 26 and well-intentioned proposals that are deferential to
tyrannical governments and insufficiently concerned with human
suffering. Because the consequence of either version of elitism is
that certain national or ethnic groups are somehow less entitled
than others to the enjoyment of human rights, the theory is fundamentally immoral and replete with racist overtones.

121. I am indebted to Professor Guido Pincione from the University of Buenos Aires for
our stimulating discussions on this point.
122. See, e.g., Pollis, supra note 13, at 22-23; Tushnet, supra note 110, at 1394.
123. Relativism influenced the British colonial administrators. See B. Williams, supra
note 97, at 20.
124. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., Pollis, supra note 13, at 22-23.
126. Id. McWhinney's work is another example of this paradox. See E. McWhinney, supra
note 5, at 209 ("eurocentrism").

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

B.

[Vol. 25:4

The Conspiracy Theory of Human Rights

The final aspect of relativism to be discussed is what Karl Pop1 7
per might describe as "the conspiracy theory of human rights.'
This theory asserts that human rights are a Macchiavelian creation
of the West calculated to impair the economic development of the
Third World. Starting from the Marxist assumption that civil and
political rights are "formal" bourgeois freedoms that serve only the
interests of the capitalists,1 2 8 the conspiracy theory holds that
human rights serve the same purpose in the international arena. It
sees them as instruments of domination because they are indissolubly tied to the right to property, and because in the field of international economic relations, the human rights movement fosters
free and unrestricted trade which seriously hurts the economies of
Third World nations. Furthermore, proponents of the conspiracy
theory charge that human rights advocacy amounts to moral imperialism. 12 9 In short, "the effect, if not the design, of such an exclusive political preoccupation [is] to leave the door open to the most
30
ruthless and predatory economic forces in international society."
The conspiracy theory, however, fails to justify the link between
the support for human rights and support for particular property
rights or trade policies-a fundamental flaw. The argument made
in this paper does not presuppose or imply any position in this
regard. Moreover, to claim that civil and political rights must be
suppressed as a necessary condition for the improvement of Third
World economies grossly distorts the facts. As Louis Henkin put it:
[H]ow many hungry are fed, how much industry is built,
by massacre, torture, and detention, by unfair trials and
other unjustices, by abuse of minorities, by denials of
-freedoms of conscience, by suppression of political association and expression?313
The contention that the West imposed human rights on the
world and that "poor peoples" do not care about freedom is clearly

127. 2 K. Popper, supra note 70, at 94.
128. See, e.g., Marx, On the Jewish Question, in The Marx-Engels Reader 42 (2d ed.
Tucker 1978).
129. For an account of the Marxist critique, see Murphy, supra note 20, at 438-42.
130. E. McWhinney, supra note 5, at 211. Cf. Tushnet, supra note 110, at 1398 (the fact
of unnecessary human suffering alone is enough to support the critique of "rights" theory).
131. L. Henkin, The Rights of Man Today 130 (1978).
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First, it contradicts the plain fact that a growing aware-

ness exists in the Third World about the need for reinforcing the
respect for human rights.1 33 Second, even if, gratiaargumentandi,

some Western plot created human rights philosophy, that fact
alone would not necessarily undermine its moral value. Conspiracy
theories (such as vulgar Marxism, "ideologism," and Critical Legal

Studies) assert that the true explanation of a phenomenon consists
of discovering the groups of people or hidden interests which are

interested in the occurence of the phenomenon and which have
plotted to bring it about.1 34 To be sure, conspiracies do occur. As

Popper conclusively showed, however, the fact that conspiracies
rarely succeed ultimately disproves the conspiracy theory. Social

life is too complex and the unforeseen consequences of social action too many to support conspiracy as the explanation of every

social phenomenon. 135 Institutions originally designed for a certain
purpose often turn against their creators. Thus, even if the law of
human rights was originally conceived as an ideological tool against

communism, today human rights have achieved a universal scope
and inspire the struggle against all types of oppression.

'

In other

words, the circumstances surrounding the origins of human rights
principles are irrelevant to their intrinsic value and cannot detract
from their beneficial features.
V. CONCLUSION
The human rights movement has resisted the relativist attack by

emphasizing that social institutions, including international law,
132. Id.
133. Cf. the statement by the All Africa Council of Churches/World Council of Churches
(1976), cited by Haile, supra note 17, at 584 (describing the system of checks and balances
that prevented gross abuses of human and civil rights in traditional African societies); the
statement by the Arab Lawyers' Union at their meeting of December, 1983, reprinted in 9
Hum. Rts. Internet Rep. 564 (1984) ("The basis of the legitimacy of any regime or system of
government is related to its effective observance of human rights, particularly those set
forth in the Universal Declaration."). See also Nickel, supra note 48, at 45 (human rights
appeal to many peoples, not just to Westerners).
134. 2 K. Popper, supra note 70, at 94.
135. Id. at 95.
136. South Africa is a case in point. Maybe in 1948 the framers of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights did not intend for it to apply to the black majority in South Africa.
Maybe they thought that democracy "among whites" was enough to comply with the Declaration. The international community has subsequently rejected that interpretation, however,
and today the law and philosophy of human rights are the main bases for the claims for
freedom by the black majority.
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are created by and for the individual. Consequently, as far as
rights are concerned, governments serve as but the agents of the
people. International norms aim to protect individuals, not governments, by creating concrete limits on how human beings may be
treated.13
I have suggested that cultural relativism is not, and ought not to
be, the answer to human rights concerns. Supported neither by international law nor by independent moral analysis, cultural relativ-

ism exhibits strong discriminatory overtones and is to a large extent mistaken in its factual assumptions.
I also demonstrated that regardless of its historical origins, the
international law of human rights cannot mean one thing to the

West and another to the Third World. International human rights
law embodies the imperfect yet inspired response of the international community to a growing awareness of the uniqueness of the
human being and the unity of the human race. It also represents
an eloquent body of norms condemning the effects of organized societal oppression on individuals. Fortunately, the Third World is
now starting to play a role in the process of universalizing human
rights. The significance of its new role will increase when governing
elites cease to use authoritarian traditions as a shield against legitimate demands for basic human rights.

137. For example, the purpose of the prohibition of the use of force, U.N. Charter, article
2, para. 4, is to spare humanity from the horrors of war-to prevent human suffering. Although the Charter articulates the rule as an inter-governmental prohibition, its humanitarian underpinnings should be kept in mind. Governments are thus made responsible for the
maintenance of peace as agents of humanity, not merely for their own benefit.

VIRGINIA
JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW

VOLUME 25
NUMBER 4
SUMMER 1985

MANAGING BOARD
1A. RuBESTEI
Editor-in-Chief

LAURA

B. SCHWAB
Managing Editor

GEORGE

ROBIN C. CARNAHAN

ANN C. GAIL
NINA GucKE

CARE

SUSAN E. SAMUELS
Executive Editors

H. KnoG

CATHERINE L. POTTER
ELIZARETH STEWART

Notes Editors

L Gumpm CHEmFAT
JONATHAN M. CLARK, JR.
GEORGE R. A. DoumAR

CONRAD SCHNEMER

Articles Editors

Research & Projects Editor

SENIOR EDITORIAL BOARD
MELCHIOR BALTAZAR
SARAH E. BRETON

KATHRYN A. BERNEtT
KENNETH L, CocHmAN
LINDA J. EBAUGH

NANcy J. KELLNER
ANN M, KmNY
Hcic
JANE A. TLm
ROBINSON

K. NoMGHAM

BFAN F. O'CoNNoR
JONHANw

At PETERSON

SuSAN R. PODOLIsY
ABBY S. TAns
RACHEL

S.

WmE

EDITORIAL BOARD
JOHN J. BALmS, JR.
DAVID

J. BEDRmAu

SONDRA J. BERENSON

DOUGLAS R.
MRuIE-AREI

ScismNE

EnL

JAms KRmssMAN

ELLIS
FAUvER

PAMELA S. PASSMAN

J. JEFFREY BROWN

CRAIG FesmmAN

SARAH L COLuNS

JOHN A. GEHA~R

GEORGE R. CONSTANTINOPLE

BERRY

BR=Ly KuLu
CHARLES B. Sn~uoNs
JOHN P. SThGI

HEATLEY

BOARD OF ADVISORS
R. ANGULO
RIcHARD B. BIU.ER

MANUEL

DEREK W. Bow-r
RONALD A. CAPONE
DONALD K. DUvAL.L
Wnijws N. ESKREDGE, JR.

WILBUR L, FUGATE
ROBnR IL KNIGHT
MONROE LEIGH
RICHARD B. LILLICH'

DAVID A. MARm"
JOHN NoRON MooRSTEFAN RIESENFELD

PAUL B. STEPHAN MI
PETR WEMAN

Rum=R WoLum
*FacultyAdvisors

